COMMITTEES

Senator McCARTHY (Northern Territory—Minister for Indigenous Australians) (18:46): I present two government responses as listed on today's Order of Business and seek leave to have the documents incorporated in Hansard. Leave granted. The documents read as follows— Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security report: Review of the amendments made by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 NOVEMBER 2025 Recommendations made in the Review of the amendments made by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 Committee Recommendations Recommendation 1: The Committee recommends that the Government implement a periodic survey, starting in three years from the presentation of this report, to ascertain ongoing economic impacts of the TOLA Act legislation on Australia's ICT industry and the results should be made publicly available.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 2: The Committee recommends the Government, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, develop a prescribed set of requirements for information that must be included in technical assistance requests.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 3: The Committee recommends that s317C of the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended to clarify that a designated communications provider does not include a natural person, where that natural person is an employee of a designated communications provider, but will only apply to natural persons insofar as required to include sole traders.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 4: The Committee recommends that Part 15 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended to remove references to 'systemic vulnerability'.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 5: The Committee recommends that s 317ZG of the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended to describe the 'prohibited effects' of a technical assistance request, a technical assistance notice or a technical capability notice.

Such an amendment could take the form of the words put forward by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor in his recommendations 9 and 10, and the government may consider incorporation of additional definitions in s317B of the Telecommunications Act 1997 arising from the proposed amendment. Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate.

Recommendation 6: The Committee recommends that the Department of Home Affairs develop, maintain, and publish non-exhaustive guidance documents that set out non-binding examples of what may constitute a 'whole class of technology' for the purposes of defining a systemic weakness. Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate.

Recommendation 7: The Committee recommends the Government commission a review of Commonwealth legislation to determine whether the concept of 'serious offence', 'relevant offence', and other similar concepts: should be made consistent across different Acts of Parliament; and whether the threshold for the concept of 'serious offence' in all Commonwealth legislation should be—at a minimum—an indictable offence punishable by a maximum penalty of seven years' imprisonment or more, with a limited number of exceptions.

This body of work should inform, or occur as part of, the eventual electronic surveillance bill being considered by the Department of Home Affairs and other departments. Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate.

Recommendation 8: The Committee recommends that the relevant provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 be amended to require the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and law enforcement agencies to seek external authorisation from the Attorney-General or issuing authority to carry out concealment activities in relation to the execution of computer access warrants following the initial 28 day window provided in the respective acts.

The Committee recommends that such an application should allow the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation or law enforcement agencies to carry out concealment activities within a window of time not exceeding six months from the expiry of the initial 28 day window, with the option to seek additional external authorisation for a further six months if required.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 9: The Committee recommends that the Government make clear that no mandatory assistance order, including those defined in section 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 and section 201A of the Customs Act 1901, can be executed in a manner that amounts to the detention of a person where that agency does not otherwise have any lawful basis to detain the person.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 10: The Committee recommends that s21A of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to limit authorisation of activities under voluntary assistance provisions to the Director-General of Security and Deputy Directors-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 11: The Committee recommends that s 21A(1)(e) and s 21A(5)(e) of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to confine the scope of the immunity from civil liability offered under the Act to 'conduct that does not result in serious personal injury or death to any person or significant loss of, or serious damage to, property'.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 12: The Committee recommends that s21A of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to require the Director-General of Security to be satisfied of the reasonableness and proportionality of the conduct of a voluntary assistance request prior to issuance.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 13: The Committee recommends that s21A of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to require the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to retain written reasons underpinning a voluntary assistance request.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 14: The Committee recommends that s21A and s34AAD of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to state that nothing in either section authorises the Director-General of Security to make a request of a person that is properly the subject of a technical assistance request as set out by s317G of the Telecommunications Act 1997.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 15: The Committee recommends that the Government make clear, for the avoidance of doubt, that the compulsory assistance order power in s34AAD of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 does not authorise the detention of person to whom the order applies where the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation does not otherwise have any lawful basis to detain the person.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 16: The Committee recommends that s34AAD of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to state that the requirement to comply with a compulsory assistance order is only enlivened once the specified individual has been provided with a written notice that outlines what they must do to ensure compliance with the order.

This notice should also clarify the consequences of failing to comply. Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate.

Recommendation 17: The Committee recommends that s34AAD of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to require the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to advise the individual subject to a compulsory assistance order the conditions associated with that order at the time the written notice is provided or at such time as the conditions are known.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 18: The Committee recommends that the Government amend the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 to expand the jurisdiction of the IGIS to oversee the intelligence functions of the Australian Federal Police.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 19: The Committee recommends that the Government amend the Intelligence Services Act 2001 to provide the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security with the ability oversee to the intelligence functions of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 20: The Committee recommends the Government give further consideration to the proposal from the INSLM for an Investigatory Powers Division within the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and provide a response on the proposed model or any recommended alternatives by September 2022.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 21: The Committee recommends the Government consider the proposal for an Investigatory Powers Commissioner, as recommended by the INSLM, and provide a response on the proposed model or any recommended alternative models by September 2022.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 22: The Committee recommends that the Government expressly clarify that the Commonwealth Ombudsman must consult with relevant agencies to identify operationally sensitive material that should be removed or amended before publication of a report.

Section 317ZRB(7) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 should then subsequently be repealed. Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate.

Recommendation 23: The Committee recommends that s317LA of the Telecommunications Act 1997 be repealed so that State and Territory police are not required to seek the approval of the Australian Federal Police for a technical assistance notice. Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate.

Recommendation 24: The Committee recommends that s 34 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to require the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to report to the Attorney-General when a device is removed from premises in the execution of a computer access warrant and the duration of the removal. Response: The Government notes this recommendation.

However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 25: The Committee recommends that: the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation provide annually to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) a copy of its annual report appendix in relation to Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (TOLA) authorisations, consistent with current practice for telecommunications data access authorisations; and the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be amended, as required, to provide that the PJCIS may review matters in relation to TOLA authorisations of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 26: The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation brief the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security on the acts or things implemented as part of a compulsory assistance order to facilitate and assist the ongoing review and oversight of the legislation.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 27: The Committee recommends that s 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 and s 201A of the Customs Act 1901 be amended to require agencies to report to inspection bodies on the execution of assistance orders and publish those figures in their respective annual reports.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 28: The Committee recommends the definition in s 4 of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 be amended to allow the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to review the amendments made by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 of its own motion.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 29: The Committee recommends s 29 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be amended to require the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to commence a review within three years once the Committee becomes aware through existing annual reporting requirements that the technical assistance notices or technical capability notices provided by Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 have been used.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. _____ Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security: Advisory Report on the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 2020 NOVEMBER 2025 Recommendations made in the Advisory Report on the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 2020 Committee Recommendations Recommendation 1: In accordance with the Committee's recommendations from previous reports, which the Government has agreed to, the Committee recommends that the Government ensure that the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman's has sufficient resources to enable effective oversight of powers under the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 2: The Committee recommends that a new subclause be added to the proposed Clause 182 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to provide that designated international agreements must be published and tabled in the regulations, subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and subject to a period of disallowance.

For the commencement of the regulations, proposed Schedule 1 should be amended to provide that regulations made under clause 3 (i.e. listing an agreement as a designated international agreement) cannot commence until no earlier than the expiry of the standard period for disallowance (i.e. 15 sitting days) under the Legislation Act 2003, or until the commencement of the other party's agreement, whichever is the longer.

For the period for disallowance, the bill should be amended to provide that the statutory disallowance period for regulations made under proposed clause 3 of Schedule 1 is the longer of: the standard period for disallowance under the Legislation Act 2003; or the period for disallowance that applies in the parliament of the foreign country (i.e. the other party to the relevant international agreement).

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 3: The Committee recommends that an additional subclause be added to the proposed Clause 182 of Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to provide that a designated international agreement may be renewed or extended for a period of three years without completing the parliamentary treaty process, if such a renewal or extension is proposed without amendment to the agreement.

However, the Committee recommends that the clause also provide that, following the term of the initial agreement and any additional three year period, any further renewal or extension should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and disallowance even where no amendment is proposed. Finally, the same clause should also be amended to provide that, whenever an amendment to a designated international agreement is made or proposed, the amended agreement must be specified as a new agreement in the regulations and thus subject to the usual parliamentary treaty process and be subject to disallowance.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 4: The Committee recommends that a new subclause be included in proposed Clause 3 of Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to provide that—in order to qualify as a designated international agreement—the agreement must: prohibit the foreign government from intentionally targeting an Australian citizen or permanent resident; or prohibit the foreign government from intentionally targeting a non-Australian person located outside of Australia if the purpose is to obtain information about an Australian citizen or permanent resident; in relation to production orders for the interception of communications, require that the interception activities of the foreign government only be carried out for the purpose of obtaining information about communications of an individual who is outside of Australia; provide that all production orders must comply with the minimum requirements for foreign orders specified in paragraph 2.61; include safeguards for the use, handling and disclosure of information, as set out in paragraph 2.62; provide that all production orders must comply with the domestic law of the relevant foreign country; provide that production orders must not last longer than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the approved purposes of the order; provide that no production order may relate to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of a political offence or an offence that is not recognised in the ordinary criminal law of Australia; and provide that a production order may only be issued if the same information could not reasonably be obtained by another less intrusive method.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 5: The Committee recommends a subclause be included in proposed Clause 3 of Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to provide that a designated international agreement shall not permit a foreign government to: issue an order at the request of or to obtain information to provide to the Australian government or a third-party government, nor shall the foreign government be required to share any information produced with the Australian government or a third-party government. such a prohibition will not preclude a foreign government seeking authorisation to share information as set out by Recommendation 4.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 6: The Committee recommends a subclause be included in proposed Clause 3 of Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to provide that incoming international production orders under a designated international agreement must only be issued for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of serious crime, including terrorism.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 7: The Committee recommends that proposed Clause 182 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to provide that, for the purposes of the Act, an agreement—and a foreign government—will be considered to satisfy the statutory requirements (including the requirements set out in Recommendation 4 and Recommendation 8 of this report) if the Attorney-General, with the concurrence of the Minister for Home Affairs: determines that the agreement and the foreign government satisfy the statutory requirement; and submits a written certification, including a detailed explanation, of such a determination to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.

That certification should be provided at the same time that the regulations are tabled. Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate.

Recommendation 8: The Committee recommends that the proposed Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to state that a country seeking a designated international agreement with Australia must meet the following criteria: Demonstrates respect for the rule of law and the principles of equality and non-discrimination, as set out in paragraph 2.103; Demonstrates respect for applicable international human rights obligations and commitments, as set out in paragraph 2.104; Clear legal procedures and restrictions governing the use of electronic surveillance investigatory powers, as set out in paragraph 2.105; and If: There is an agreement between Australia and a foreign country; and If the agreement deals with (among others things) the issue of orders (however described) by a competent authority (however described) of the foreign country; and One or more offences against the law of the foreign country are punishable by death The name of the agreement must not be specified under paragraph (1)(b) unless the Minister has received a written assurance from the government of the foreign country relating to the non-use of Australian-sourced information obtained by virtue of the agreement in connection with any proceeding for a death penalty offence in the country or territory.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 9: The Committee recommends that, where relevant, the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 2020 be amended to implement the recommendations set out in the Committee's report of its Inquiry into the Impact of the Exercise of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Powers on the Freedom of the Press, including recommendation 2 (i.e. that the current role of the Public Interest Advocate, as provided for under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended in line with the terms of that recommendation and expanded to apply to applications for international production orders.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 10: The Committee recommends that proposed Clause 2 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to include a definition of 'urgent circumstances' which provides that in circumstances where: there is an imminent risk of serious harm to a person or substantial damage to property exists or, in the case of a national security IPO application, there is an imminent risk of loss of significant intelligence; and the production order is necessary for the purpose of dealing with that risk; and it is not practicable in the circumstances to submit an application in writing; such circumstances would constitute 'urgent circumstances' for the purposes of making an oral or telephone application.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 11: The Committee recommends that proposed Clauses 22(3), 33(3)(a), 52(3)(a) and 63(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended in a manner that is consistent with Recommendation 11 of the of the Committee's Review of the Mandatory Data Retention Regime.

That is, these provisions should be amended so that: only officers or officials who are designated as authorised officers by the head of an enforcement agency may apply for IPOs; only officers or officials who hold a supervisory role in the functional command chain should normally be capable of being designated as 'authorised officers' (although other individuals who hold specific appointments—rather than entire classes of officers or officials—may also be capable of being designated as 'authorised officers') in order to authorise an individual to be an authorised officer, the head of an enforcement agency must be satisfied that it is necessary for an individual to be an 'authorised officer' in order for the individual to carry out his or her normal duties; prior to the head of an enforcement agency authorising an individual to be an 'authorised officer': the relevant senior officer or official must complete a compulsory training program in relation to proposed new Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979; and the head of the enforcement agency must be satisfied that the senior officer or official has the requisite experience, knowledge and skills to exercise the powers under proposed Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 12: The Committee recommends that proposed Clause 2 of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 amended to insert a definition of senior position holder that is consistent with the provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 13: The Committee recommends that proposed Clauses 83 (3)-(4) and 92(3)-(4) of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended so that the Director-General of Security may only delegate powers to a senior position holder Response: The Government notes this recommendation.

However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 14: The Committee recommends that proposed Clauses 101(3)-(4) of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to provide that the Director-General of Security can only authorise Australian Security Intelligence Organisation employees, or classes of Australian Security Intelligence Organisation employees, at the Executive Level 2 (or equivalent) and above to make applications on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation's behalf.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 15: The Committee recommends that proposed Clause 83(9) and 92(8) of Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be amended to require the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to provide the Attorney-General with: the particulars of the urgent circumstances because of which the person making the request considers it necessary to obtain oral agreement the matters that ASIO would have been required to set out in a written application to the Attorney-General.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 16: The Committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure that the Commonwealth Ombudsman has sufficient resources to enable effective oversight of the proposed powers granted by the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 2020.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 17: The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to ensure that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security is given appropriate resources to enable effective oversight of the proposed powers granted by the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 2020.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 18: The Committee recommends that the proposed Schedule 1, Division 4 be amended to include an express provision for the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, or an official of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, to access the register of international production orders in connection with its oversight responsibilities.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 19: The Committee recommends that proposed Schedule 1, Clause 153 be amended to allow international production order information to be used, recorded or disclosed for the purposes of an official of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security exercising their duty as an official.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 20: The Committee recommends that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 be amended to allow for officials of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to share information relating to the international production orders regime with members of the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman and members of the Attorney-General's Department where sharing such information is connected to the roles and duties of the member of the organisation.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 21: The Committee recommends that: the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended to provide that a report made under proposed subsection 94(2BBA) should form part of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation's unclassified annual report; and the proposed subsection provide that the recommended statistics would not be provided where the Director-General of Security considers that providing such statistics would prejudice Australia's national security, or prejudice a national security investigation.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 22: The Committee recommends that proposed Schedule 1, Clause 135 and 136 be amended to require the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to: retain a copy of a particular document for three years, or for as long as any of the data obtained under an international production order is retained, whichever is the longer; and retain all relevant materials supporting an application for international production order for this period.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 23: The Committee recommends that the Bill be amended to require the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to commence a review on the effectiveness and continuing need for an international production orders regime on the earlier of the date that is: three years after the date on which the first designated international agreement comes into force; or five years after the commencement of the proposed Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation. However, given the passage of time since the report was tabled, a substantive Government response is no longer appropriate. Recommendation 24: The Committee recommends that, following implementation of the recommendations in this report, the Bill be passed by Parliament.

Response: The Government notes this recommendation.