MATTERS OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE
Dr SCAMPS (Mackellar) (15:33): Thank you to the member for Wentworth for raising this matter of public importance. We all agree that nothing is more important than having the real capacity to defend our nation. The AUKUS pact is the largest defence spending commitment since the Second World War, yet it has not received the level of scrutiny or open debate in this place that it warrants.
It is estimated that the defence deal will cost Australia at least $370 billion. Under the initial AUKUS agreement, Australia was set to receive two used Virginia class nuclear powered submarines from the United States plus one new model as early as 2032. Yet, as we heard on the weekend, all three nuclear powered submarines that Australia will receive will now be second-hand.
While the government has described this decision as placing a premium on simplicity as opposed to being linked to production challenges in the US, this decision, like much of AUKUS, remains shrouded in secrecy. That secrecy has been a problem since the beginning. The 2021 announcement blindsided France and caused significant diplomatic fallout for Australia and the United States.
That pattern has continued, leaving many more questions than answers. Defence experts and many in my community are asking: Can the submarines be delivered on time and on budget? Do we need nuclear submarines, or would conventional alternatives be more suitable to replace the Collins class fleet?
How and where will nuclear waste be managed? And, perhaps most importantly, does this deal genuinely serve Australia's defence and strategic needs? The lack of transparency means the public may never get a clear answer.
Other countries have subjected AUKUS to scrutiny. The UK House of Commons defence committee has released its report on the AUKUS defence pact after a year-long review into the partnership. The Pentagon has also reviewed whether AUKUS aligns with the US president's America-first agenda.
Australia has had no equivalent process. Instead, the government has established a new committee to monitor AUKUS's work, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, but much of its activity will be conducted in secret. Its membership is restricted to Labor and coalition MPs only, and it will only have limited ability to report publicly.
This approach risks creating a small group of insiders with access to curated information who avoid public debate and scrutiny. In the absence of a government led inquiry, civil society has stepped in. An independent public inquiry supported by non-profit organisations and unions and chaired by former environment minister Peter Garrett will hold hearings and deliver a report later this year.
This is good, but it should not be left to civil society to perform the scrutiny role of government. There are also serious questions about the feasibility of the plan to arm Australia with nuclear powered submarines, particularly under the ambitious timelines outlined. The United States is— Mr Littleproud: It's secret technology, the best technology.
Dr SCAMPS: Can you please stop interrupting? Mr Littleproud: Keep going. Dr SCAMPS: Yes, thank you.
The DEPUTY SPEAKER ( Ms Claydon ): Please. Dr SCAMPS: The United States is already struggling to meet its own submarine production targets and faces a shortfall in its fleets. Critically, under US law, it cannot sell submarines to Australia if doing so undermines its own capability, yet Australia has already contributed billions to the US and UK industrial bases.
This raises a deeper strategic issue. A core principle of national security is sovereignty—the ability to maintain and operate our own military capabilities. Under AUKUS, Australia is spending vast sums on assets over which it will not have full control while becoming more tightly bound to US strategic objectives.
There are concerns that this could expose Australia to greater risk, including a potential conflict between major powers without any guarantee of US support. There are also local impacts to consider, including proposals for defence industry expansion and nuclear infrastructure, particularly in places like Port Kembla. There is still no plan for nuclear waste.
No site has been identified, despite a commitment from the defence minister in 2023 to outline a process for identifying waste sites within 12 months. Australia must always take its national security seriously. In an increasingly uncertain strategic environment, it is both reasonable and necessary for governments to invest in defence capability and pursue strong international partnerships.
Agreements like AUKUS reflect an effort to prepare for future challenges. (Time expired)