Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No. 1) Bill 2026

Senator SHOEBRIDGE (New South Wales) (18:35): Part 3 of schedule 1 of this bill extends the sunset date for what are called network activity warrants, data disruption warrants, account takeover warrants and related authorisations under the Surveillance Devices Act and the Crimes Act, and it proposes to extend them by another three years to 4 September 2029. The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, the INSLM, did a review and found that those powers had been rarely used, but they had been used, sometimes effectively, against some serious cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crime.

That's not in dispute; it's what's in the report. What is in dispute is whether they should be retained for another three years without the raft of stronger essential safeguards that the INSLM said—and said years ago, now—were needed if these powers were to remain on the statute books. It's interesting to note the trigger for comprehensive reform of electronic surveillance goes back to 2019, and that was the Richardson review of the National Intelligence Community's legal framework.

That's seven years of runway. The runway has been laid out for seven years for reforms that still haven't taken off. And extending the sunset to late 2029 effectively tells agencies that they can have these powers without safeguards—and the public can be the subject of them without safeguards—for years.

This is why the Greens have put in an amendment to change that date to 1 July 2027. That is more than enough. The Law Council's submission to the inquiry supported this.

They made it clear with their recommendation that this is essential in order to give life to recommendations 6, 7 and 8 of the now longstanding INSLM review into these powers. And what the Law Council said is that we need a clear assurance from the government that the safeguards will be put in place this parliamentary term. It has already taken too long for this to happen.

Support in principle for modernising law enforcement administration doesn't mean waving through provisions that shift risk onto the people least able to bear it—whether it's a low-level drug courier facing an inflated gross-weight charge with no mistake-of-fact defence, or the public, who are waiting years longer for surveillance safeguards that were promised back in 2019.