Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No. 1) Bill 2026
Senator BLYTH (South Australia) (18:38): The coalition will not oppose the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No. 1) Bill 2026. Much of this bill is technical or procedural in nature. Where it modernises, clarifies and improves Commonwealth criminal justice, policing and prosecution laws, the coalition is supportive of those measures.
The bill contains practical amendments dealing with AFP powers at Western Sydney International Airport, electronic warrant applications, ACT Policing, serious drug offence thresholds and conflicts involving the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. It also covers extradition arrest powers and telecommunications interception legislation. The opposition is concerned about a number of aspects of this bill and will be moving amendments to ensure that significant changes to the operational capabilities of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission receive the scrutiny they deserve and that expanded extradition arrest powers remain subject to the appropriate parliamentary review.
The coalition will also ask questions in the committee stage about schedule 3 relating to the changes to the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983. This bill exposes the Albanese government's continuing failure to deliver the comprehensive reform of Australia's electronic surveillance framework that it has been promising the Australian people for almost four years.
Part 3 of schedule 1 extends account takeover warrants, data disruption warrants, network activity warrants and related emergency authorisations for a further three years until 4 September 2029. The coalition supports the continuation of these important cyber disruption powers. The former coalition government introduced these powers back in 2021 because serious organised crime, child exploitation networks, drug trafficking syndicates and other criminal enterprises were increasingly operating online and exploiting encrypted platforms and sophisticated digital technologies.
The coalition saw the importance of increasing measures around these particular areas. These powers allow agencies to not simply observe serious criminal activity but intervene directly, identify offenders operating anonymously, disrupt criminal networks and prevent further offending. The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor found that the identity and disrupt powers provide effective operational capabilities in circumstances where other powers would have been ineffective and recommended that they should not be allowed to sunset.
The threats these powers address have not disappeared, and some would say that the online environment has become even more devious. Serious organised crime continues to adapt, and new technologies are continually exploited as they operate across jurisdictions not just here in Australia but globally. The need for the extension is a direct consequence of the government's failure to complete a comprehensive electronic surveillance reform—the same reform that they have been promising to deliver for the last four years.
The government accepted the need for a modern coherent electronic surveillance framework, yet here we are almost four years after them taking office and there is still no comprehensive legislative package for this—no modern electronic surveillance act and no clear timetable for its reform. In the meantime, criminal networks continue to evolve and exploit technologies.
Extending the sunset clause keeps necessary powers alive, but it is not a substitute for the comprehensive reform that is genuinely needed in this space that this Labor government promised to deliver. National security legislation cannot drift from one sunset extension into the next while governments postpone the difficult work of modernising the laws so that they can keep pace with technology and the threat environment.
It's fair to say that Labor has been caught napping in this area. Labor haven't done anything to make sure that they are keeping pace with the technology that criminal networks and exploitation networks are using, and they haven't kept pace with the threat environment. The opposition will move a second reading amendment concerning the removal of the ACIC's ability to apply for data disruption warrants.
The coalition accepts the broader policy objective of refocusing the ACIC as a dedicated criminal intelligence agency responsible for collecting, analysing and disseminating intelligence about serious and organised crime. The concern is not simply about policy direction; it is the legislative vehicle chosen by the government and the level of scrutiny this significant change will receive.
Removing the ACIC's data disruption warrant power is not a minor or incidental amendment. It changes the powers, the functions and the operational capabilities of one of Australia's principal criminal intelligence agencies. Data disruption warrants can interfere directly with data used by serious and organised criminals, disrupt criminal communications, degrade criminal platforms and undermine the ability of criminal networks to operate effectively here in Australia.
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Bill 2026 is already before the parliament and is intended to establish a modern legislative framework for the ACIC and its proposed intelligence-focused role. That bill has been referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, parliament's specialist committee for scrutinising intelligence and national security legislation.
The PJCIS is the appropriate forum to examine the future powers, functions and safeguards, as well as the accountability arrangements, that apply to the ACIC. The coalition's second reading amendment will call on the government to incorporate part 3 of schedule 1 into the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Bill 2026. This is not about opposing the continuation of cyber disruption powers or preventing the reform of the ACIC.
It is about ensuring that significant national security reform is considered through the appropriate legislative vehicle and receives specialist parliamentary scrutiny, which is something I think the people of Australia expect to happen with legislation that comes through this place. Proper debate and proper scrutiny is something that the Australian people expect to see.
It has been this government's habit to constantly guillotine bills as they come through this place so that they are devoid of any kind of scrutiny. We end up with bills that are a mess and that create all sorts of unintended and, at times, intended consequences. Changes of this significance should not be bundled into an omnibus bill containing largely technical and procedural amendments, but that is something that we have seen from this Labor government, where they take a whole lot of normal, routine updates to bills, bulk them all together and then put quite extraordinary things in with them.
Schedule 4 of the bill aligns arrest powers under the Extradition Act 1988. This is aligned more closely with the general Commonwealth arrest powers available under the Crimes Act 1914. The Australian Federal Police advised the Senate inquiry that the amendments address the genuine operational difficulties that they encounter, including limits on entry to premises and the use of reasonable force when executing an extradition arrest warrant.
It is undesirable for police to face avoidable operational barriers when a person sought for extradition is inside private premises and where a lawful arrest warrant is in force. The coalition supports giving police officers the practical powers they require to execute lawful extradition warrants safely and effectively. However, these remain significant coercive powers involving entry to a premises, the use of reasonable force and the deprivation of liberty.
Whenever parliament expands coercive powers exercised by the state, it has a responsibility to ensure that those powers operate as they are intended to operate. The opposition will move an amendment in Committee of the Whole requiring a parliamentary review of the schedule 4 amendments. The amendment will require the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, or another committee constituted by a resolution of the Senate, to begin an inquiry into the operation of the amendments within two years of their commencement.
The review will consider any unintended consequences arising from the expanded extradition arrest powers. The coalition's amendment would specifically require the inquiry to examine the operational effect of restricting the execution of arrest warrants issued under the Extradition Act and the Crimes Act to certain hours while search warrants issued under those acts are not subject to the same restrictions.
The government has circulated an amendment seeking to remove that specific reference from the terms of reference. While it is the coalition's preference to retain that detail, we do not think its removal will limit the committee's ability to examine those issues and therefore will not oppose the government's amendment in this case. This is a sensible accountability measure.
It does not deny police the powers they need or delay the commencement of the amendments. It ensures parliament returns to examine how the expanded powers have operated in practice and can address any unforeseen problems revealed by operational experience. There is nothing inherently wrong with omnibus legislation where amendments are genuinely technical, administrative in nature or consequential, but omnibus bills should not become a vehicle for reducing scrutiny, which is what we've seen from this government.
They should not reduce scrutiny of significant policy changes involving intelligence agencies, law enforcement powers or the fundamental rights and liberties. The coalition has consistently supported strong national security laws and backed Australia's intelligence, policing and prosecution agencies with the powers that they need to confront terrorism, serious organised crime, cybercrime, child exploitation, drug trafficking and other serious offending.
Strong powers must also be accompanied by strong safeguards, by proper accountability and by rigorous parliamentary scrutiny. Those principles are not inconsistent. Proper scrutiny improves legislation, identifies unintended consequences and builds public confidence in the integrity and effectiveness of Australia's national security framework.
Good legislation should be assessed against operational experience rather than enacted and then forgotten, particularly where it expands coercive powers. The coalition supports the practical and operational improvements contained in this bill. We support the extending of cyber disruption powers because they remain necessary and effective, and we support ensuring that Australia's police, intelligence and law enforcement agencies have the capabilities they need to keep all Australians safe.
But we also insist that significant changes to operational capabilities of the ACIC receive specialist parliamentary scrutiny and expanded extradition arrest powers be reviewed after the commencement of this bill. That is precisely what the opposition's amendments will seek to achieve. The government must also finally deliver the comprehensive reform of Australia's electronic surveillance laws that the intelligence, security and law enforcement community has repeatedly called for.
Extending a sunset clause cannot become a substitute for comprehensive legislative reform. For all of those reasons, the coalition will not oppose this bill and urges the government to support the opposition's amendments.