Universities Accord (Opening the Doors of Opportunity) Bill 2026
Mr WALLACE (Fisher) (13:26): I rise to speak on the Universities Accord (Opening the Doors of Opportunity) Bill 2026. At the outset, I want to make the coalition's position very clear. We've not finalised our position on this bill.
It makes substantial structural changes to Australia's higher education system. It should therefore be tested thoroughly, properly, carefully and transparently through the Senate committee process. The Senate has now referred the bill to the Education and Employment Legislation Committee, which is due to report on 3 September 2026.
That inquiry should examine the practical effect of this legislation; its fiscal consequences; the protection for students and providers; and the safeguards, if there are any, against the misuse of executive power. If the bill comes to a vote in this House before that committee has reported, the coalition will not oppose it, but our final position will be determined after the evidence has been heard and the committee has completed its work.
That is the responsible approach, because this is not simply a bill about funding more student places. It's a bill about who holds power over Australia's universities. It's about how many students they can enrol, which courses they can offer, where growth occurs, the extent to which institutions can respond to student demand and how international students are allocated, and the conditions under which providers can continue to receive Commonwealth support.
At its heart, this bill shifts Australia away from a system in which institutions retain meaningful flexibility towards a system in which the minister, directly or indirectly, holds extraordinary power over the sector. The minister sets the domestic Commonwealth supported place pool. The minister sets the international student allocation pool.
The minister may determine demand driven courses. The minister can directly allocate places in specified circumstances. The minister can impose conditions on specified providers.
The minister determines many of the operational details of needs based funding through guidelines. Those powers are not merely exercised by this minister; they are powers that would be inherited by every future Minister for Education. That is the proper test that we in this place have to examine.
We shouldn't legislate on the assumption that this minister nor every future minister will exercise broad discretionary power cautiously, transparently and wisely. Parliament must assess the machinery it creates, not simply the intentions of the government currently occupying the Treasury benches.