Universities Accord (Opening the Doors of Opportunity) Bill 2026

Mr BIRRELL (Nicholls) (13:08): I went from Dookie to Shepparton. That was my university pathway. I, too, rise to speak on the Universities Accord (Opening the Doors of Opportunity) Bill 2026.

We have a bill before us that I think requires greater scrutiny and we haven't finalised our position on this. We will refer this bill to a Senate committee for inquiry and report, and we will make our decision based on the evidence that comes through that process. If the bill comes to a vote in this House before the committee reports, we won't oppose it here, but we're not ready to endorse it yet.

This does make significant structural changes to the higher education system, and it does deserve to be examined closely. On the process of this bill: the sector has raised concerns with us about how this bill was developed. The universities did not see the bill before it was tabled, there was no exposure draft, the stakeholders were shown limited material under confidentiality arrangements, and elements of the drafting have actually surprised the sector.

When you're rewriting the architecture of higher education in this country, it shouldn't be done in a surprised way; it should be a collaborative approach with the sector and people affected by these changes. When you take away the title's 'opening the doors of opportunity'—it sounds great; 'opportunity' was the key word in my maiden speech—what the bill actually does is, one: let the minister determine the total pool of Commonwealth supported places distributed through ATEC, the Australian Tertiary Education Commission; two: let the minister determine the pool of international student places, again distributed through ATEC; three: give the minister the power to allocate places directly, give binding directions to ATEC and impose conditions on providers; and four: establish needs based funding, with the key details set out in ministerial guidelines rather than legislation.

The common thread in all four things that this bill does is expanded ministerial control, and that is a major transfer of control from institutions to executive government. That is a central issue—not the funding and not the places but the power and where that power resides. I think that's something that needs to be examined further.

In relation to the money, the minister's public sales pitch talks of $3.6 billion over the decade and 230,000 extra university places. In the explanatory memorandum, it says something different. It refers to $2.5 billion in additional net funding over 11 years from 2020-25 and 200,000 additional commencing domestic students over the next decade.

Those two documents were tabled on the same day, and they're $1.1 billion apart, so I've got some questions in good faith for the minister: Where does that extra $1.1 billion come from? Where did the additional 30,000 places come from? And why do MYEFO papers show $2.5 billion over 11 years, when the minister is out announcing $3.6 billion over a decade?

If the numbers changed, why wasn't there an update in the budget? Was it offset by this government's cuts to research, or is it more debt? And are Australians able to trust that the $3.6 billion that the minister is talking about does not become a higher number in the future?

These are matters for the minister to come in and straighten out and explain. Under this bill, the minister will control the size of domestic student loans, and the minister will control how these domestic places are allocated. The minister sets the international student pool and influences where those places land.

He controls the key settings of needs based funding through the guidelines—and student fees and Commonwealth contributions are the lifeblood of a university's finances. What we're talking about here is basically ministerial leverage over the financial viability of every single provider in the country. In relation to the Australian Tertiary Education Commission, it was sold to us on the basis that ATEC sits at the centre of the system as an independent body.

But let's look at what ATEC actually is. The ATEC commissioners can be terminated by the minister where the minister is satisfied performance has been unsatisfactory for a significant period, but those terms aren't defined. ATEC cannot employ its own staff or people assisting it; departmental employees are made available by the secretary.

ATEC cannot engage its own contractors or consultants. The secretary does that on behalf of the Commonwealth. ATEC must take account of the minister's short-term and long-term priorities, and that's subject to ministerial direction.

And ATEC should have but does not have a regional commissioner. ATEC is independent of the universities, but it's not independent of the government, and that is something of concern, needing clarification and possibly some changes. The issues here are where this parliament sits and the way a democracy should work.

In relation to this bill, ministerial decisions on the domestic and international student pools are not disallowable. Direct ministerial allocations of demand-driven places are not legislative instruments and so are not disallowable. And conditions imposed on a specific provider are not legislative instruments, so they're not disallowable and not subject to a merits review.

So a provider who is on the wrong end of one of these decisions has very little to fall back on beyond judicial review. And there's a real question about accountability, transparency and procedural fairness and what role this parliament has in this decision-making process. That's the sort of question we want a Senate committee to look at.

This bill doesn't seem to be built on competition, deregulation or institutional autonomy. It's not built on central allocation and ministerial control. That's a philosophical shift, and it should be named as one.

The bill treats competition between universities as a problem to be managed. But competition between universities can benefit students. It can drive institutions to compete on quality, on student experience, on career outcomes, on reputation and on what they actually offer.

I acknowledge that there are legitimate concerns about the market power of very large universities; of course there are. But a concern about the misuse of market power is not necessarily a reason to switch the competition off altogether. Under the current system, universities are permitted to enrol more students than they are funded for; they educate more students for the same taxpayer dollars.

This bill calls that overenrolment and creates a financial penalty for it. But why would you penalise a university for doing more with the same amount of money? And some can.

So this bill shifts from a capped funding model to a capped places model, and different courses attract different Commonwealth contributions. If you change the course mix, you change the cost. The committee should examine whether this bill carries that unquantified fiscal risk.

This bill also establishes needs based funding grants with an equity component and a regional component. And I want to be really constructive, particularly on this issue, because regional components of how this bill operates really matter. The equity component covers Indigenous students.

But, beyond that, eligibility depends on the needs based funding grant guidelines, and that's determined by the minister. The amount paid depends on the base amounts and modifier amounts, which are also determined by the minister through guidelines. So, how generous this scheme really is and who qualifies is not settled by this parliament; it's settled by the minister.

Regional students deserve more certainty than that. I don't want to leave the House with the impression, after this contribution, that there's nothing here. The sector does have real problems.

There are quality concerns as well as challenges of AI, which are coming down the line on all of us. There's pressure on rankings and access that is uneven and can be uneven across regions and across outer suburbs. This bill does hand government some very powerful tools, and, used powerfully and transparently, those tools could I think be used quite well, particularly when it comes to regional universities.

Directions to ATEC, direct allocation to demand-driven places and prioritisation of courses tied to regional workforce could be turned into a supporting economic opportunity in places like the Goulburn Valley and Bendigo and right across those regional cities where there are good-quality regional standalone universities or where the city universities have campuses.

My own example is a bachelor of applied science degree at the University of Melbourne—the Dookie campus, which is the old ag college. What a wonderful degree that was. Then I had the opportunity, a bit later in life, to do an MBA.

I couldn't go to Melbourne to do an MBA, and online is not really for me. But La Trobe University offers a regional MBA—in your seat of Bendigo, Deputy Speaker Chesters, and in Albury-Wodonga, in Mildura and in Collins Street. That MBA regional delivery through teleconference and facilitators was really a wonderful educational opportunity.

This bill also opens Commonwealth supported places to non-table-A providers for priority classes of courses, replacing the narrower national priority concept. That's a simpler pathway for private providers to deliver in areas where there is genuine workforce need. This contribution about the bill is a bit 'I want to know more and I want a Senate committee to examine it more'.

I think there are some real opportunities in this. We are going to examine this bill very closely. It's always difficult.

Handing many powers to the minister can create some opportunity, it can create some risk, and I think we need to have a further conversation about that. There are major concerns about centralisation, accountability, competition and institutional autonomy. The Senate committee process—and I hope this does get referred to a Senate committee—should test the practical effects, the fiscal risks and the safeguards: what potentially could happen and how we could constructively put some safeguards around that.

Our final position will be based on the evidence and on the national interest. I hope this bill receives that level of scrutiny.