Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026
Mr WALLACE (Fisher) (17:15): We say that there is no greater responsibility for any government than to protect its citizens. That's very true, but what we saw in Bondi last year in December is an example of where there was a collective failure on the part of our intelligence agencies and our police. Let's face it: it was a failure.
It resulted in the death of 15 people—it's incredibly sad—who were there to enjoy Hanukkah, a religious festival for Jewish people. I won't go into too much detail because, obviously, it's the subject of a royal commission, but I'm looking forward to seeing the results and recommendations of that royal commission so that governments across this country and our intelligence agencies and our law enforcement can properly assess and ensure that Bondi never happens again.
Between the intention to keep Australians safe and the capacity to do so sits a body of law. Maintaining that law— A division having been called in the House of Representatives— Sitting suspended from 17:16 to 17:28 Mr WALLACE: Maintaining that law is parliament's responsibility. It means ensuring that police, intelligence and security agencies have the lawful powers they need to prevent terrorist acts, disrupt those who would facilitate them and manage the ongoing risk posed by serious terrorist offenders.
The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 comes before the House in a serious and evolving security environment. Australia's national terrorism threat level remains at 'probable'. ASIO has warned that more Australians are being radicalised, that radicalisation is occurring more quickly and that children and young people are increasingly exposed to violent extremist ideologies.
The coalition will not oppose this bill in the House. Many of the powers extended by this bill were created and strengthened by coalition governments. They are important national security powers.
They must not be allowed to lapse. But support for necessary counterterrorism powers is not a blank cheque for government. Labor has serious questions to answer about why it waited until only months before these powers expire to introduce this legislation.
There is a pattern of conduct here. The government knew these powers were due to expire on 7 December 2026. Labor legislated that sunset date in 2023.
It has had the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor's review of the post-sentence order regime since March 2023. Yet Labor did not table its response until 12 August 2026, the day it introduced this bill. Parliament must have time to scrutinise laws that affect both community safety and individual liberty.
As the Deputy Chair of the PJCIS, I constantly get bills that are pushed before the committee with unrealistic timeframes by this government, allowing insufficient time for stakeholders to have their important say on important legislation. The government cannot present major counterterrorism changes and expect parliament to wave them through because it has allowed time to run down.
That is why the coalition will use the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security process to test the government's proposals and hear directly from the AFP, ASIO and other intelligence agencies. The central test is pretty simple: does this legislation keep Australians safer? Where that question cannot be answered clearly, the government must prove its case.
The bill extends key counterterrorism powers and frameworks for three years, until 7 December 2029. They include control orders under division 104 of the Criminal Code, preventative detention orders under division 105, post-sentence orders for serious terrorist offenders under division 105A, and police powers under division 3A of part IAA of the Crimes Act. These provisions can be mistaken for administrative housekeeping until an agency needs them.
In reality, they are practical capabilities designed to manage terrorism risks. Control orders allow a court to impose tailored restrictions where necessary to protect the public from a terrorist act, prevent support for terrorism or prevent hostile activity overseas. They can regulate movement, communication, association, technology use and other activities.
Preventative detention orders provide a short term capability in exceptional circumstances. They can permit detention for up to 48 hours to prevent an imminent terrorist act or preserve evidence after an attack. The post-sentence order regime addresses the continuing risk posed by certain terrorist offenders at the end of their custodial sentence.
The Crimes Act also contains emergency powers that can be vital in responding to terrorism related threats, including powers to stop, question and search people in defined circumstances. These powers are subject to statutory thresholds, safeguards and judicial oversight. They are extraordinary powers for extraordinary circumstances, but they must remain available when the threat requires them.
The coalition supports their continuation. The coalition built much of this legal architecture—control orders and preventative detention orders in 2005, continuing detention orders in 2016, temporary exclusion orders in 2019 and extended supervision orders in 2021. These are practical, lawful powers to manage serious terrorism risks, backed by appropriate oversight.
But, when the threat environment changes, the law must be able to respond likewise. Where the government proposes to replace an existing framework, it must demonstrate that it is not diminishing Australia's ability to manage risk. That is particularly important in relation to the bill's changes to post-sentence arrangements for serious terrorist offenders.
The current regime includes continuing detention orders and extended supervision orders. An extended supervision order allows court supervised conditions to be imposed on a person in the community. It can operate for up to three years, it can be renewed if the legal requirements continue to be met, and it is subject to annual review.
The government proposes to reposition control orders as the primary mechanism for imposing conditions on serious terrorist offenders after release. Under the proposed model, an extended supervision order would not be available as a direct first-instance application by the AFP minister. Instead, it would be considered as an alternative where a court is considering a continuing detention order but is not satisfied that the detention threshold has been met.
The government says operational capability will be preserved. The coalition's response is simple: prove it. Before parliament proceeds, we need to know whether operational agencies support the new structure, whether any practical capability available under the existing framework will be lost, how an offender who continues to pose a serious risk as a control order approaches expiry will be managed and whether the framework supports the intelligence and surveillance work needed for future applications.
These matters go directly to Australia's capacity to manage the risk posed by people convicted of serious terrorism offences after they leave prison. Schedule 4 creates warrant powers intended to assist agencies in deciding whether to seek a control order for an offender nearing the end of a sentence, but the relevant warrants are available while the offender remains in custody or under a detention order.
Parliament should test whether the AFP and ASIO are satisfied that adequate intelligence and surveillance capability remains available once an offender returns to the community. Australia should not surrender an existing national security capability unless what it is replaced with keeps Australians at least as safe, if not safer. One of the most disturbing developments in the current security environment is the radicalisation of children and young Australians.
Youth radicalisation is a present and alarming challenge. ASIO has warned that radicalisation is accelerating and minors are increasingly embracing violent extremism. The government's own figures show that around half of people identified in programs to counter violent extremism are under 24, that 31 per cent are under 18 and that eight per cent are aged between just 10 and 14.
Prevention, early intervention, online safety, family support and deradicalisation must be a national priority. The bill itself reflects the seriousness of this trend. Currently, confirmed control orders for young people aged 14 to 17 are subject to a special maximum duration of just three months.
The bill removes that limit, meaning the general maximum period of 12 months would apply—that is, the same as for an adult. The coalition will examine this measure carefully. Strong powers should be available where necessary to protect the community and prevent serious harm.
But it's important to say what this amendment does and does not do. It does not make control orders available for children under 14. It does not mean every young person will receive a 12-month order.
Courts retain discretion over the duration and conditions of an order, and the best interests of the young person remain a primary consideration. The amendment removes the special three-month maximum and permits the ordinary maximum to apply, subject to judicial discretion and statutory safeguards. The coalition supports necessary and proportionate powers, but legal powers alone are not a youth deradicalisation strategy.
The government must also demonstrate that prevention and deradicalisation programs are effective, properly targeted and capable of intervening before a young person moves from online exposure to extremist ideology, planning or, worse, violence. This bill also comes before the House in the context of serious questions about Labor's wider approach to terrorism linked Australians returning from Syria.
The coalition's position is clear: the Commonwealth should have the strongest lawful control possible over when and how terrorism linked Australians return. In October 2022, the Albanese government repatriated four Australian women and 13 children from Syria. It argued a planned return was safer because the Commonwealth could control and manage the process.
But Labor later changed course. The AFP commissioner confirmed at Senate estimates that Labor adopted a policy of so-called self-managed returns. In effect, the government would not—allegedly—assist people to leave, but, if they made their own way out and arrived in Australia, it would deal with them then.
That is not a coherent national security strategy. It means the Commonwealth does not control departure, route, timing or circumstances of return. It manages the consequences once people arrive.
That creates obvious questions about risk assessments, intelligence coverages and operational control. In May, four women and nine children returned. Three women were arrested on arrival, one was charged with alleged membership of a terrorist organisation and entering or remaining in a declared area, and two were charged with alleged crimes against humanity involving slavery.
Those allegations are before the courts, and each person is, of course, entitled to the presumption of innocence, but Australians are entitled to know what assessments were made, what powers were considered and why the Commonwealth did not retain greater control over these returns. The temporary exclusion order regime was established by the coalition because, where the legal threshold is met, the Commonwealth must retain the capacity to control the timing and conditions of a terrorism linked Australian's return.
The coalition also introduced the Criminal Code Amendment (Keeping Australia Safe) Bill 2026. Labor voted that legislation down. Australians deserve a government that plans properly, acts early and gives police and intelligence agencies the tools they need before a risk becomes urgent.
The coalition will not oppose this bill, because the powers it extends are important and necessary and should not be allowed to lapse, but the government should not confuse support for these powers with approval of Labor's handling of national security.