CONSTITUENCY STATEMENTS
Ms SPENDER (Wentworth) (16:38): I rise to reflect on the ANZUS alliance as we mark its 75th anniversary. I come to this issue as a parliamentarian but also as a proud granddaughter. My grandfather, Sir Percy Spender, was one of the architects of ANZUS, as well as of the Colombo plan.
As foreign minister, he rightly saw that Australia's future security lay not with Britain but in the Pacific, anchored by the US, and he pursued that vision doggedly. He didn't get everything he wanted. He had hoped that ANZUS would be a NATO-style guarantee.
What Australia got was more modest: a treaty of consultation, not automatic mutual defence. But, nevertheless, it has been one of the most important partnerships that Australia has had, a treaty that is made real not just by words or even by the words of leaders but through millions of relationships, as well as economic and security ties. Intelligence sharing through Five Eyes, technology access and extended deterrence in a contested Indo-Pacific are not things that Australia could do alone.
The public agrees. The Lowy Institute polling found that 80 per cent of Australians still rate the alliance as important to our security. But the world that produced ANZUS in 1951 no longer exists.
Over the past decades, the remarkable growth of our Asian neighbours has transformed their wealth and power. China's share of global GDP in 1951 was around five per cent. Today, it is closer to 19 per cent, on par similar to the USA.
India is not far behind, and Indonesia is expected to be the fourth largest economy in coming years. In this world, we cannot expect that the US will play the same role that it has. Washington has noticed this shift too and wants a more self-reliant Australia.
Defense secretary Pete Hegseth and Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby have both made it clear that burden sharing is no longer optional for US allies. As former DFAT secretary Peter Varghese has put it, 'That pressure might be something that we should welcome, not resent. It may force Australia to greater sovereignty.' And as Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute has argued, 'Australia can’t want the alliance more than the Americans themselves want it.' Our region will only become more consequential to our own safety.
We are moving into a time where we cannot be expected to be made safe by an English speaking major power, and that is a new moment for Australia, different to our time since Federation. That should not frighten us, but we should also recognise that this is a substantial shift. My grandfather's insight was that Australia must anticipate change and adapt to it and that our foreign relationships must rest on mutual interest, not sentiment.
That insight is as important now as it was in 1951. The alliance matters, but it is not the only relationship that matters. It will not substitute for genuine Australian sovereignty.
A more independent sovereign Australia is not a rejection of the alliance. It makes us a stronger partner within it.