Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026

Ms CAMPBELL (Moreton) (17:52): In May 2010, a computer programmer, a bloke named Laszlo, bought a couple of pizzas from a shop in Jacksonville, Florida. You might be thinking to yourself, 'Well, what's the big deal about that?' But it was a special purchase because it was the first real-world usage of bitcoin, now perhaps the most well-known cryptocurrency. The purchase became known as Bitcoin Pizza Day.

Now people who have cryptocurrency tend to eat pizza on that day as it comes through every single year. But things have changed a lot since that time. Of course the use of cryptocurrency has become far more commonplace.

For early adopters and investors, it's been a bit of a wild ride, with extreme price volatility across the market. In Australia, cryptocurrencies are a recognised part of today's economy and many people use them as legitimate investment or financial tools. A March 2022 report from the Cyber Security Industry Advisory Committee estimated that at least three million Australians own a crypto asset.

Often this is made possible by the ease and convenience of a crypto ATM. But the number of crypto ATMs in Australia has increased rapidly in recent years. There were 23 in 2019 and there are now 2,000.

This makes Australia, as we've heard, the third in the world for the number of crypto ATMs. The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre estimates about $275 million is being moved through these crypto ATMs in Australia year in and year out. Of that $275 million, 99 per cent of those transactions were deposits—people exchanging their hard-earned cash for cryptocurrency.

Volatility is not the only risk associated with accessing cryptocurrency through crypto ATMs. In June 2025, the Australian Federal Police warned about the increase of investment scams. They warned about the increase of romance scams.

They warned about the increase of extortion emails involving crypto ATMs as the final step in fraudsters' attacks on everyday Australians, and they cited a loss of more than $3 million in a 12-month period. When AUSTRAC examined the 90 most active crypto ATM users in 2024, it determined that 85 per cent of those were either scam victims or money mules who had been deceived or coerced into moving money.

There aren't just potential negative impacts for individuals choosing to invest in cryptocurrencies via crypto ATMs, because they can be used anonymously and across borders. There are legitimate concerns about their usage for criminal activities as well. When cryptocurrency is purchased through conventional online platforms, it's linked to a bank account.

When they're purchased through conventional online platforms, the transaction creates a clear, traceable record. These purchases typically involve verified identities and leave an audit trail that we can follow, that agencies can follow, that law enforcement can follow and that can be monitored by financial institutions and regulators. By contrast, when cryptocurrency is bought using cash through crypto ATMs, the level of traceability is significantly reduced.

Although some machines may require limited identification, such as a phone number or basic ID checks, these requirements vary and are generally less stringent than those applied to bank based transactions. As a result, the ability of authorities to track the source of funds and to follow the movement of money is far more limited when crypto is acquired through cash based ATMs than when it is purchased using a bank account.

This issue is what the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 is all about. While this bill focuses on the use of crypto ATMs, I want to be very clear that it is not aimed at people who are legitimately using crypto ATMs for investment. It is aimed at cracking down on money laundering through high-risk mechanisms, such as crypto ATMs.

For some time, Australia's security and intelligence agencies have been warning about the growing convergence of threats to our national security. Traditional distinctions between different forms of risk and criminal behaviour have become increasingly blurred, and this is a government that knows that we need to do something about that. Threats that were once seen as separate and distinct now intersect.

They reinforce each other. They're linked. In the past, criminal activities such as terrorism, foreign interference, organised crime, money laundering, people smuggling and espionage operated in isolation, in silos.

Now, we're seeing that change. Today, these threats are frequently interconnected, with criminal networks and hostile actors exploiting the same systems, technologies and financial channels to pursue a range of illicit objectives. Money laundering, in particular, is a common thread running through all of these threats.

The ability to move and disguise illicit funds underpins criminal and hostile activities, enabling them to operate without detection and enabling them to expand their operations. That's why money laundering has become the focal point, the central point of focus, for Australia's national security policy. It's also why proposed reforms are specifically targeted at strengthening controls in this particular area.

Schedule 1 of this bill introduces targeted changes to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act to strengthen the government's ability to respond to serious financial crimes, and the amendments create a new power that allows for restrictions to be placed on products, services, delivery methods and other arrangements that are assessed as posing high risks of money laundering or terrorism financing.

These products and these services are collectively referred to as the high-risk mechanism, which I mentioned earlier. The bill establishes a new regulatory framework that authorises the chief executive officer of AUSTRAC to oversee and control the use of such high-risk mechanisms. Under this framework, the AUSTRAC CEO will be able to impose broad sector-wide restrictions or prohibitions, rather than relying solely on individual enforcement actions.

This is intended to enable faster, more consistent and more proportionate regulatory responses where systemic risks are identified across an industry or a delivery channel. The AUSTRAC CEO will have to consider a range of elements when assessing a proposed restriction. This includes the kind of harm involved and how serious it is, because, if you are targeting some of the most vulnerable people in our community, we need to know.

If you are targeting the most vulnerable people in our community, the CEO must have powers that allow them to deal with it appropriately. The AUSTRAC CEO will also have to consider how effective the proposed restriction would be in reducing harm, whether the service could still be offered through other means and any other relevant factors set out in the regulations.

The new power is designed to enable AUSTRAC's flexible and proportionate risk based response to addressing new and changing money-laundering and terrorism-financing operations. It enables regulators to respond effectively to changes in risk profiles, criminal methodologies and technological developments, but it also ensures that reporting entities retain the very important ability to operate efficiently and effectively.

Before the AUSTRAC CEO makes a decision to apply the power, the framework requires a minimum 30-day consultation period with the public and relevant government agencies unless urgent circumstances justify faster action. Importantly, the power is not intended to be used simply because a mechanism involves digital assets, involves speculative behaviour or carries financial or investment risks.

We acknowledge that many people use crypto and technology in ways that are new and for legitimate purposes. These measures, though, are critical because the Australian Institute of Criminology estimates that serious and organised crime cost Australia as much as $82.3 billion in 2023-24, which has left many victims facing financial loss and absolutely devastating hardship.

Schedule 2 of the bill updates the definition of 'financing of terrorism' in section 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act so it reflects recent changes that have been made to the Criminal Code. In simple terms, it makes sure that the law clearly covers new offences created under the Criminal Code. This means that providing financial support to a state that sponsors terrorism is clearly captured under Australia's anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism-financing laws.

The amendments enable new sanctions offences to be added to the bill in the future. They also have an international impact, which meets the nation's commitment to the Financial Action Task Force. This is the body which leads global action to tackle money laundering and terrorist and proliferation financing.

The Financial Action Task Force researches how money is laundered and how terrorism is funded. It promotes global standards to mitigate the risks and assesses whether countries are taking effective action. Schedule 3 of the bill focuses on technical amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act.

These amendments are in response to the 2024 amendments to this act which ensured Australia's compliance with international standards. The amendments in this bill work for Australian businesses which have obligations under these laws, making compliance more efficient while still operating within strengthened anti-money-laundering frameworks. As the minister has outlined, the strategic landscape and threats to our national security have changed, and are continuing to change, and, as a government, we must rise to those threats.

We must tackle them head on. We must put legislation in place. We must put regulations in place, because tackling those threats is critical for our nation's security, for our economy's security and to assure that Australians remain safe.

Money laundering remains a consistent piece of this puzzle. Each year, billions of dollars are generated through serious criminal conduct such as drug trafficking, child exploitation, cybercrime, tax evasion and other illegal or corrupt practices. In addition, authoritarian regimes rely on money laundering to support corruption, destabilise democratic systems and weaken the rule of law both within their borders and internationally.

These illicit funds are then laundered to conceal their origins and enable further harm. Transnational and organised crime groups continue to adapt their methods, and we need to adapt to those. They continue to develop new ways to exploit members of the Australian community and to target Australia's financial and economic systems for profit.

We know that crypto ATMs are a mechanism for such activity. Of course, not every usage of a crypto ATM is linked to money laundering and not every usage of a crypto ATM is linked to criminal activity. But, unfortunately, as we've learned from our law enforcement agencies, a substantial amount of the use of crypto ATMs is linked to generating profits from criminal activity.

The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill addresses the growing risks associated with crypto ATMs and the modern financial crime environment, which can be exploited to commit serious offences and harm Australia's economy and our communities.