Online Safety Amendment (Strengthening Enforcement for the Social Media Minimum Age) Bill 2026

Senator HENDERSON (Victoria) (18:28): Minister, thank you very much. You certainly have confirmed that it is not the intention of the eSafety Commissioner to issue notices in relation to the production of documents to children and to parents. That's terrific to hear.

But what you're asking us to do is to trust the government in relation to that assurance. The bill before the Senate says something very different. It says that the eSafety Commissioner can issue that notice to any person in relation to compliance with the social media ban.

And I have to say that, like many Australians, I don't trust the government. Even if I did trust the government on this issue, it's not appropriate for the government to be bringing forward a bill that does not reflect the government's intention. When any government proposes laws which amount to overreach and amount to an inappropriate use of power or an excessive use of power, we would say that that is most improper.

That is very disappointing. I think that this is all being done for political purposes. The government is well aware of our serious concerns, but the government is also well aware of the serious concerns of many witnesses who appeared in the Senate inquiry.

I want to say that we have brought forward some other amendments which will be considered. The coalition strongly believes that parents need to be back in control of their children's online safety. We want to see greater transparency from big tech—we want to hold big tech to account—but we also oppose sweeping new coercive powers for the eSafety Commissioner.

Australian families deserve more choice, more control and more transparency online. I have to say the discussion we had in question time today and Minister Wong's statement about opting out of the algorithm show that the government doesn't really understand what it's doing when it comes to online safety. Even if the government's proposal were to opt out of a content recommendation feed based on a user's profile, an algorithm is still required to serve that content.

An algorithm is a set of rules which determine how content is served. Even if there is a non-profiling algorithm that is an option for a user, there will be some type of algorithm still required. We believe—this is not the complete solution but a starting point—algorithmic transparency is critical.

It's critical even for the eSafety Commissioner to do her job. If the eSafety Commissioner is going to be commencing proceedings insofar as whether social media companies have made reasonable efforts to remove children under the age of 16 from their platform, then understanding what is driving the way content is served is very important. That's why, in one of our amendments focusing on algorithmic transparency, we are seeking transparency in relation to the content recommendation algorithm, the content moderation algorithm and the age assurance algorithm.

This is very narrow. It only concerns large social media platforms. I note—and this evidence was brought forward in our Senate inquiry principally by the Free Speech Union of Australia—X in part publishes its algorithm for its 'for you' feed.

Anyone can search for it and look for it, and it's very instructive as to how X determines how content is served. We certainly think that this is a very important first step. We want to understand whether social media platforms are driving hidden harms through their algorithmic parameters.

We want to understand what's being censored, what's being suppressed, what's being hidden and what's being amplified. We want to understand whether, when there is very harmful content being served, the algorithm recognises that and then addresses that appropriately. Algorithmic transparency, as I say, is a very significant first step.

I do note with some concern that the Tech Council has put out a statement raising concerns. I'm having a quick look at that now. They've raised concerns and say that the amendment could increase security risks by enabling private companies to track sensitive information, scammers to deploy spyware, criminal groups to compromise devices or predators to surveil children.

It could turn a measure intended to protect children into a new route for monitoring them. We agree. Unfortunately, I don't think the Tech Council has read our amendment, because the amendment makes it very clear that, when we are seeking algorithmic transparency, there are very, very significant carve-outs.

In the proposed section 63P—protection of safety, security and privacy—the algorithmic transparency obligation does not apply to any personal information. It does not apply to any information which materially compromises the safety or security of an end user or the platform. It does not apply because there is no reference to proprietary information such as the source code, and it does not apply to information materially to assist a person to circumvent or defeat systems designed to protect children or prevent cyberattacks, fraud, spam, platform manipulation or other malicious activity.

There's a very, very strong set of safeguards in this amendment. I have to say that I am disappointed that the Tech Council has misrepresented our amendment in the way that it has. I understand why the Tech Council doesn't want transparency, but, frankly, our perspective is we don't care because we think that, as a very important starting point, to hold the big tech social media platforms to account, algorithmic transparency is critical.

The other very important amendment that we have brought forward is an amendment which requires platforms, particularly the likes of Google, Microsoft and Apple, to open up their safety tools to Australian consumers. At the moment, those safety tools can be triggered to stop pornography, other really harmful material, from ever reaching the phone. That is available to government departments and to large corporations through enterprise agreements but it's not available to parents.

It's not available to Australian consumers. We say that parents must have the freedom to choose digital safety services that they want to use to protect their children. There are some wonderful options available for parents.

There are various different apps available that can be used to block harmful content, to restrict apps and websites, to manage screen time and to keep children safe online. Because what these safety tools do if they are opened up to third party apps and to parents is they stop the harm ever reaching the device, not just the phone but any device. We think that parents deserve the same access to these safety tools as large corporations and government departments.

This is about the simple principle that families should have that choice, not big tech. We are very concerned that the government does not see any merit in supporting these amendments, as I have been advised. This makes no sense.

Parents deserve these safety tools. Parents deserve every option in this country to keep their kids safe online. This was a recommendation of the digital platforms inquiry run by the ACCC in report No. 5 handed down in September 2022.

What has the government done about this? Nothing, and that's not good enough.