COMMITTEES

Senator BLYTH (South Australia) (15:41): I present the report of the Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee on the MRH-90 Taipan helicopter incident, together with accompanying documents. I move: That the Senate take note of the report. Inquiry into MRH-90 Taipan Helicopter incident I begin by acknowledging the servicemen who lost their lives on the evening of 28 June 2023—Captain Danniel Lyon, Lieutenant Maxwell Nugent, Warrant Officer Class Two Joseph Laycock and Corporal Alexander Naggs.

What happened to them was a tragedy. I pay tribute to their service, and they should never be forgotten. I further thank the families of the servicemen who lost their lives for their courage in providing evidence to this inquiry.

Thank you also to my fellow committee members, the committee secretariat and all those who participated in this inquiry, mindful of the difficult and deeply sensitive nature of this inquiry. Background This was an inquiry into the tragic accident of the MRH-90 Taipan helicopter, callsign Bushman 83, while conducting a night-time training exercise during Exercise Talisman Sabre.

Importantly, the actions of the crew of Bushman 83 were not called into question. Retired Majors David Lamb and Ian Wilson, who are both highly experienced pilots, told the committee that the environment the pilot was operating in would challenge even the best pilot on the planet to recover. The MRH-90 helicopter project had well-documented and reported issues.

Following the accident, the MRH-90 helicopter was decommissioned. In conducting this inquiry, the committee sought to comprehend the regulatory framework that is designed to provide for the safety of military aviation operations. This is a comprehensive and complex regulatory area that involves: The processes required under the Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR).

The role of the Defence Aviation Safety Authority. The role of the Army Aviation Test and Evaluation Service (AATES), which is the Army's only DASR-authorised flight test organisation; and Safety requirements and obligations under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011and associated regulations. While this is a complex web of regulation, complexity must not be used to obscure safety expectations and accountabilities.

TopOwl Helmet This inquiry found that Defence could not articulate what authorised process was used, under the Defence Aviation Safety Regulation, to approve the TopOwl helmet mounted sight display version 5.10 into service. As the committee discovered, AATES concluded that version 5.10 of the TopOwl helmet represented an unacceptable risk to flight safety as it implied a very high risk of pilot disorientation if used in poor conditions and the likely consequence was that disorientation at low levels could lead to multiple fatalities.

The fundamental concern with version 5.10 was that the altitude information presented was consistent with cockpit displays when the pilot was looking forward but reversed pitch and roll information when the pilot looked to the side. This is particularly challenging for pilots when they are operating in a situation where they do not have full vision of the horizon and are more reliant on the symbology provided by the TopOwl helmet.

While Defence told the committee it had developed a range of procedures that were incorporated into training and guidance documents, the committee received contrary evidence that the gravity of the software's defects had not been adequately communicated to the aircrew. No formal documentation outlining Defence's risk mitigation strategy to attempt to address the flight test concerns, and which are a requirement under workplace health and safety legislation, were provided to the committee.

In light of this evidence, the committee has made several recommendations, including: that the Defence Aviation Safety Authority review Army aviation's compliance with Defence aviation safety regulations, including the processes and adherence to processes for the testing, evaluation and approval of capability and modification. that Defence consider whether amendment is required to the Defence aviation safety regulations to ensure that foreign certifications for major modifications cannot be relied upon to approve modifications for service.

The committee has recommended that the government establish an independent review of the DFSB investigation into this accident. The committee has also made a range of recommendations relating to the management of fatigue and building a safety culture within the Australian Defence Force. This includes a review of the Army's aviation fatigue risk management procedures and promoting safer reporting pathways.

Recommendations have also been made regarding death and bereavement support for the families of ADF personnel. The hardest part of this inquiry was hearing from the families of those who lost their lives. I want to take the time now to read to the Senate some of their words as they reflected on their son, their husband, their partner and their brother.

In his testimony, Daniel Nugent, father of Lieutenant Nugent, stated that: Max decided in year 11 that he wanted to become an Army officer. He began that journey in 2018 as a 19-year-old at the Royal Military College. By 21, he was an Army officer training to become a pilot.

By 24, he had achieved his goal, becoming a special operations pilot with the 6th Aviation Regiment. On 28 July, he was exactly where he wanted to be, doing his job alongside his mates. Chadine Whyte, Lieutenant Nugent's partner, said: My hope moving forward is that institutions learn from Max and that they lead with the same integrity he demanded of himself.

Anything less is an insult to his life and memory and to those who remain in service. Lieutenant Nugent's sister, Samantha, told the committee: If Max wasn't in the Army, he would have been at home with us. Just before he left to go to Talisman Sabre, we were planning our joint birthday dinner, to spend it as a family.

Sarah Loft, the partner of Corporal Naggs, said: He was a proud soldier. One of the first things that we did together was the dawn service in the driveway, because it was the start of COVID. I had said to him, 'Hey, I'm doing the dawn service in the driveway tomorrow.' He goes, 'Well, yes, I will be, too.' We were two of only a few in the street in Toowoomba, freezing, listening to the neighbours' radio.

The guy bled green. David Naggs, father of Corporal Naggs, told the committee that he wasn't even informed by Defence that his son was missing. He said: It got in my head that Alex was never coming home again when I was watching a Broncos and Cowboys football game on the telly the following Saturday.

They had a minute's silence at the ground, and there was Alex's picture on the scoreboard with the rest of the boys. I thought: 'Wow. Okay.' And that's a hit, because there was no-one in uniform that came to the door.

Caitland Lyon, widow of Captain Lyon, stated: Dan was 32 years old. He was our children's daddy. He was the light and laughter of our home.

He trusted that the organisation that he served would keep him safe. That trust was catastrophically betrayed. I encourage all senators to read or watch the testimony from the families of the victims, and I thank them for their strength.

I again want to thank all of those who supported the work of the committee and provided evidence to the inquiry. May we never forget those who tragically perished: Captain Danniel Lyon, Lieutenant Maxwell Nugent, Warrant Officer Class 2 Joseph Laycock and Corporal Alexander Naggs. I seek leave to continue my remarks later.

Leave granted.